Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Decisions in Art. 78 Proceedings

Article 78 Litigation Documents

September 2021

Decision in Art. 78 proceeding - Ridgeway, Jerome (2016-02-11)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd

Recommended Citation
"Decision in Art. 78 proceeding - Ridgeway, Jerome (2016-02-11)" (2021). Parole Information Project
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd/291

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Article 78 Litigation Documents at FLASH:
The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Decisions in Art. 78
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For
more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Matter of Ridgeway v New York State Bd. of Parole
2016 NY Slip Op 30281(U)
February 11, 2016
Supreme Court, St. Lawrence County
Docket Number: 146690
Judge: S. Peter Feldstein
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
Op 30001(U), are republished from various state and
local government websites. These include the New York
State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service, and the
Bronx County Clerk's office.
This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
publication.

[* 1]

STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE
-----------------------------------------------------X
In the Matter of the Application of
JEROME RIDGEWAY,#13-B-2839,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #44-1-2015-0718.30
INDEX #146690
ORI # NY044015J

-against-

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Jerome Ridgeway, verified on October 28, 2015 and filed in
the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on November 3, 2015. Petitioner, who is an inmate
at the Gouverneur Correctional Facility, is challenging the November 2014 determination
denying him discretionary parole release and directing that he be held for an additional
24-months. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on November 9, 2015 and has
received and reviewed respondent’s Answer and Return, including confidential Exhibits
B, C and I, verified on December 31, 2015. The Court has also received and reviewed
petitioner’s Reply, dated January 11, 2016 and filed in the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s
office on January 21, 2016.
On September 13, 2013 petitioner was sentenced in Erie County Court to a
controlling indeterminate sentence of 2 to 6 years upon his conviction of the crimes of
Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs (Vehicle and
Traffic Law §1192(3)) and Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle 1. At the
same time petitioner was sentenced to an additional, concurrent indeterminate sentence
of 1 to 3 years upon his conviction, following the revocation of parole, of the crime of
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Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs (Vehicle and
Traffic Law §1192(2)). He was received into DOCCS custody on September 27, 2013 and
made his initial appearance before a Parole Board on November 19, 2014. Following that
appearance petitioner was denied discretionary parole release and it was directed that he
be held for an additional 24 months. The parole denial determination reads as follows:
“AFTER CAREFULLY REVIEWING YOUR RECORD AND
CONDUCTING A PERSONAL INTERVIEW, THIS PANEL
CONCLUDES THAT DISCRETIONARY RELEASE IS
DENIED.
YOU STAND CONVICTED OF TWO COUNTS OF DWI:
ALCOHOL OR DRUGS 3RD OFFENSE, AND AGGERVATED
[sic] UNLICENSED OPERATION IN CONNECTION WITH
YOUR ACTIONS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED. FOR
ONE OF THE DWI CHARGES YOU WERE ORIGINALLY
SENTENCED TO PROBATION BUT YOU VIOLATED AND
PRISON TIME WAS IMPOSED. THESE OFFENSES ARE A
CONTINUATION OF YOUR CRIMINAL HISTORY AND
RECORD ON COMMUNITY SUPERVISION WHICH
INCLUDES TWO PREVIOUS DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED CHARGES, A PRISON TERM FOR A DRUG
RELATED CONVICTION AND PREVIOUS
MISDEMEANORS AND FELONIES IN CONNECTION
WITH THEFT AND TRESPASS RELATED CRIMES. THE
PANEL MAKES NOTE OF YOUR PROGRAM GOALS AND
ACCOMPLISHMENTS INCLUDING YOUR
PARTICIPATION IN ASAT [Alcohol and Substance Abuse
Treatment] WHICH YOU RECENTLY STARTED IN
SEPTEMBER, RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND YOUR
CLEAN DISCIPLINARY RECORD, YOUR CERTIFICATE OF
EARNED ELIGIBILITY HAS BEEN DENIED. ALSO, YOUR
RELEASE PLANS, AND SENTENCING MINUTES HAVE
BEEN REVIEWED AND CONSIDERED.
THE PANEL REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR
DANGEROUS HISTORY OF DRIVING AND YOUR
LIMITED INSIGHT ABOUT YOUR ACTION WHICH PUTS
MULTIPLE CITIZENS USING THE ROADS AT RISK.
AFTER DELIBERATING, REVIEWING YOUR OVERALL
RECORD AND STATUTORY FACTORS, DISCRETIONARY
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RELEASE IS NOT PRESENTLY WARRANTED AS THERE IS
A REASONABLE PROBABILITY YOU WOULD NOT LIVE
AT LIBERTY WITHOUT AGAIN VIOLATING THE LAW
AND FURTHERMORE, YOUR RELEASE WOULD BE
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF SOCIETY.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the November
2014 parole denial determination was received by the DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals
Unit on May 18, 2015. On or about September 9, 2015 the parole denial determination
was affirmed. This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
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v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268,
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 701, Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521
and Zane v. New York State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848.
The Petition focuses upon the argument that the Parole Board failed to adequately
consider/properly weigh all of the required statutory factors and instead relied excessively
on the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration as well as his prior
criminal record. In this regard petitioner specifically alleges as follows:
“In light of Petitioner’s acceptance of responsibility; low risk to the
community; good behavior; and promising Release Plans, it was improper
to deny him parole. The Parole Board’s Decision impermissibly ignored
Executive Law §259-c(4), and the factors laid out in Executive Law
§259-i(2)(c)(A)(i-vi), by only perfunctorily mentioning Petitioner’s positive
qualities. In doing so, the Parole Board created a strong indication that
Petitioner’s denial of parole was a forgone conclusion.” (References to
exhibits and citations omitted).
Petitioner’s above arguments notwithstanding, a Parole Board need not assign
equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with a
discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those
factors in its written decision. See Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d
903, app dismissed 24 NY3d 1052, Valentino v. Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New
York State Division of Parole, 47 AD 3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
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the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is
supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that
it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the Parole Board Report (Initial November 2014) and
transcript of petitioner’s November 19, 2014 Parole Board appearance reveal that the
Board had before it information with respect to the appropriate statutory factors,
including petitioner’s educational and therapeutic programing records, COMPAS ReEntry
Risk Assessment Instrument, sentencing minutes, clean disciplinary record and release
plans/community support, in addition to information with respect to the circumstances
of the crimes underlying his incarceration and prior criminal record. The Court,
moreover, finds nothing in the hearing transcript to suggest that the Parole Board cut
short petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise prevented him from
expressing clear and complete responses to its inquiries. Indeed, just prior to the close of
the November 19, 2014 Parole Board interview one of the presiding commissioners
inquired as follows: “Anything else that you would like to say, sir, that would help us with
our Parole decision that we haven’t talked about?” Petitioner responded “[n]ot that I can
think of right now.”
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. Since the requisite statutory
5 of 8

[* 6]

factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s
incarceration, his prior criminal record (including multiple DWI convictions and the fact
that the offense underlying one of petitioner’s current DWI convictions was committed
while he was on probation from a previous DWI conviction) and his perceived lack of
insight. See Neal v. Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320 and Confoy v. New York State Division of
Parole, 173 AD2d 1014.
To the extent petitioner specifically argues that the results of the COMPAS Re
Entry Risk Assessment Instrument “were not properly taken into consideration by the
Parole Board,” the Court rejects such argument. In this regard petitioner asserts that
“[t]he Risk Assessment Instrument indicates that Petitioner does not pose a high risk of
felony violence, arrest, or absconding. Despite such an assessment, the parole Board
opined that Petitioner’s release was incompatible with the welfare of society. The Board’s
act of ignoring its own methodology designed to predict recidivism was improper and
illogical.” (References to exhibits and citation omitted).
Petitioner does not dispute that a COMPAS risk and needs assessment instrument
was prepared in conjunction with the discretionary parole release consideration process.
The COMPAS instrument is part of the record in this proceeding and was specifically
discussed during the course of petitioner’s November 19, 2014 Parole Board interview,
with one of the presiding commissioners noting that the instrument had been reviewed
in that “[i]t does show that your criminal involvement is at a high level as well as a history
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of violence. Your discipline in prison is good. You have a completely clean record. So it
[the COMPAS instrument] indicates that your prison misconduct is low. Arrest risk and
absconding is at a medium level. And I will say that the number one need would be
substance abuse help.”
Although the Appellate Division, Third Department, has determined that a risk and
needs assessment instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in connection with
post-September 30, 2011 parole release determinations (see Linares v. Evans, 112 AD3d
1056, Malerba v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1067, lv denied 22 NY3d 858 and Garfield v. Evans,
108 AD3d 830), there is nothing in such cases, or Executive Law §259-c(4), to suggest that
the quantified risk assessment determined through utilization of the risk and needs
assessment instrument supercedes the independent discretionary authority of the Parole
Board to determine, based upon its consideration of the factors set forth in Executive Law
§259-i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an inmate should be released to parole supervision. The
“risk and need principles” that must be incorporated pursuant to Executive Law §259c(4), while intended to measure the rehabilitation of a prospective parolee as well as the
likelihood that he/she would succeed under community-based parole supervision, serve
only to “ . . . assist members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates
may be released to parole supervision . . .” Executive Law §259-c(4)(emphasis added).
Thus, while the Parole Board was required to consider the COMPAS instrument when
exercising its discretionary authority to determine whether or not petitioner should be
released from DOCCS custody to community-based parole supervision, it was not bound
by the quantified results of the COMPAS assessment and was free to grant or deny parole
based upon its independent assessment of the factors set forth in Executive Law
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§259-i(2)(c)(A) including, as here, the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s
incarceration, his prior criminal record (including multiple DWI convictions and the fact
that the offense underlying one of petitioner’s current DWI convictions was committed
while he was on probation from a previous DWI convictions) and his perceived lack of
insight. See Rivera v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 and Partee v.
Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896, aff’d 117 AD3d 1258, lv denied 24 NY3d 901.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

February 11, 2016 at
Indian Lake, New York

___________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Justice, Supreme Court
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